Is Materialism All That Bad? Effects on Satisfaction with Material Life, Life Satisfaction, and Economic Motivation by Joseph Sirgy, M. et al.
Is Materialism All That Bad? Effects on Satisfaction
with Material Life, Life Satisfaction, and Economic
Motivation
M. Joseph Sirgy • Eda Gurel-Atay • Dave Webb • Muris Cicic •
Melika Husic-Mehmedovic • Ahmet Ekici • Andreas Herrmann •
Ibrahim Hegazy • Dong-Jin Lee • J. S. Johar
Accepted: 11 September 2011 / Published online: 12 October 2011
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract The literature in economic psychology and quality-of-life studies alludes to a
negative relationship between materialism and life satisfaction. In contrast, the macro-
economic literature implies a positive relationship between material consumption and
economic growth. That is, materialism may be both good and bad. We develop a model
that reconciles these two contrasting viewpoints by asserting that materialism may lead to
life dissatisfaction when materialistic people evaluate their standard of living using fan-
tasy-based expectations (e.g., ideal expectations), which increases the likelihood that they
would evaluate their standard of living negatively. In turn, dissatisfaction with standard of
living increases the likelihood that they would evaluate their life negatively. However,
materialistic people who evaluate their standard of living using reality-based expectations
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(e.g., ability expectations) are likely to feel more economically motivated than their non-
materialistic counterparts, and this economic motivation is likely to contribute significantly
and positively to life satisfaction. Survey data were collected from seven major cities each
in a different country (Australia, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Germany, Egypt, Korea, Turkey,
and the USA) using a probability sample (cluster sampling method involving income
stratification). The results provide support for the model. The economic public policy
implications concerning how people evaluate their standard of living using ability-based
expectations are discussed in the context of the ideals of meritocracy.
Keywords Materialism  Evaluation of standard of living  Satisfaction with material life 
Economic motivation  Life satisfaction  Quality of life Meritocracy
1 Introduction
The economics literature implies that materialism contributes significantly to a positive
quality of life (e.g., Arndt 1981; Britton 2010; Bunker and Ciccantell 2003; Fata-Vil-
lafranca and Saura-Bacaicoa 2004; Fernandez 2007; Kilbourne et al. 1997). In contrast,
quality-of-life studies have demonstrated that materialism contributes significantly to a
negative quality of life (see literature reviews on materialism by Larsen et al. 1999; Richins
and Rudmin 1994; Robert and Clement 2007). Therein lies a paradox!
If materialism contributes negatively to quality of life, then the question we should pose
is: How? More specifically we could pose the question: what is the mediating mechanism
that makes materialism a negative factor in people’s perception of their quality of life (i.e.,
life satisfaction)? Perhaps this can be explained with the way materialistic people evaluate
their standard of living (SOL). For instance, materialistic people evaluate their SOL using
inflated and unrealistic expectations (ideal-based expectations) that induce feelings of
dissatisfaction with their material life, which in turn spills over to life dissatisfaction. This
is one hypothesis that is tested in the study reported in this paper.
But then if we take this further, how can we reconcile that materialism is positively
correlated with economic motivation (e.g., Baudrillard 1997; Belk 1989; Cherrington
1980; Furnham 1990, Ch. 7; Schor 1998; Scitovsky 1986), and that economic motivation
contributes to quality of life (e.g., Layton 2009; McClelland 1961; McClelland and Winter
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1969)? Perhaps not all materialistic people evaluate their SOL using inflated and unreal-
istic expectations, and those who use realistic expectations (e.g., ability-based expecta-
tions) tend to feel more economically motivated than their non-materialistic counterparts.
In turn, economic motivation for these materialistic people is likely to contribute positively
to their life satisfaction. This is another set of hypotheses that are tested in the study
reported here.
Specifically, materialism can be construed as ‘‘bad’’ because it may lead to life dis-
satisfaction for some. But on the another hand, materialism can be viewed as ‘‘good’’
because it may make some people economically motivated, which in turn may contribute
to not only life satisfaction but also economic growth, which is often viewed as a positive
societal outcome.
Our goal with this paper is to advance theory relating to the link between materialism
and life satisfaction by developing a theoretical model that explains this paradox.
Explaining this paradox may provide further insight to the debate concerning the positive
and negative effects of economic development on quality of life. This debate can further
inform public policy regarding how economic policies and programs should be formulated
to maximize the contribution of the economics discipline to quality of life studies.
2 Conceptual Development
Materialistic people believe that the continued acquisition of possessions will lead to
greater happiness and satisfaction in life, and that lack of possessions will lead to dis-
satisfaction in life. Ironically, much empirical research has shown the opposite. In other
words, dissatisfaction with life, not satisfaction, is the result of a materialistic orientation
(e.g., Belk 1984, 1985; Burroughs and Rindfeisch 2002; Dawson and Bamossy 1991; Keng
et al. 2000; La Barbera and Gurhan-Canli 1997; Richins 1987; Richins and Dawson 1992;
Wright and Larsen 1993).
At least two explanations account for the negative relationship between materialism and
life satisfaction: top-down theory of subjective well-being and bottom-up theory of sub-
jective well-being. Quality-of-life researchers have consistently adopted these two theories
to explain the determinants of life satisfaction (see Diener 1984; Diener et al. 1999 for a
review of the literature). The top-down theory of subjective well-being states that life
satisfaction is influenced by personality or dispositional factors (e.g., self-esteem, alien-
ation, optimism, pessimism, neuroticism, and introversion/extraversion). In contrast, the
bottom-up theory of subjective well-being argues that life satisfaction is influenced by
situational factors that impact the sense of well-being in specific life domains (e.g., sat-
isfaction with SOL, job, family, leisure, neighborhood, community).
In terms of the former (top-down theory), Belk (1985) suggested that materialistic
people are usually possessive, non-generous, and envious. These are dispositional factors,
reflecting a tendency to experience negative emotions. Thus, one can argue that the neg-
ative affect related to dispositional materialism influences life satisfaction (i.e., materialism
negatively influences life satisfaction).
In terms of the latter (bottom-up theory), this theory states that life satisfaction is greatly
influenced by evaluations of important life domains. Specifically, positive and negative
affect are invested in life domains capturing certain types of emotional experiences such as
family life, leisure life, love life, work life, social life, spiritual life, and so on. One
important life domain is material life (or SOL assessed in material terms). The material life
domain houses emotional reactions related to material possessions, household income,
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savings, investment, and other material resources related to personal wealth. Thus, life
satisfaction/dissatisfaction judgments are directly influenced by how one feels about
important life domains such as material life. Sirgy et al. (1998) demonstrated that the
negative relationship between materialism and life satisfaction is mediated by evaluations
of SOL. Specifically, the study found that materialistic people are less satisfied with their
material possessions and, in turn, less satisfied with life than non-materialistic people.
Sirgy (1998) proposed that materialistic people have lower SOL evaluations because
they have inflated expectations and because they frequently employ these inflated stan-
dards when evaluating their SOL, whereas non-materialistic people have more realistic
expectations. He elaborated on various types of expectations or standards of comparison
and how materialistic people (compared to non-materialistic people) use these expecta-
tions. He delineated six types of expectations: expectations based on (1) their ideal view of
SOL, (2) what they feel they deserve in terms of financial resources, (3) what they need to
maintain a certain lifestyle, (4) what they have predicted all along in attaining a certain
level of personal wealth, (5) how far they have progressed in relation to what they had in
the past, and (6) how much personal wealth they were able to amass based on their ability
(i.e., their educational background, inheritance, socio-economic status, etc.). Sirgy argued
that materialistic people tend to make more frequent evaluations of their SOL using ideal,
deserved, and need-based expectations than non-materialistic people. Evaluating SOL
using ideal, deserved, and need-based expectations is likely to result in negative evalua-
tions of SOL, which in turn, contribute to feelings of life dissatisfaction. Conversely, non-
materialistic people tend to make more frequent evaluations of their SOL using past,
predictive, and ability-based expectations. Evaluating SOL using past, predictive, and
ability-based expectations is likely to result in positive evaluations, which in turn con-
tribute to feelings of life satisfaction.
In our study, we focus on the ideal and ability-based expectations proposed by Sirgy
(1998). We endorse Sirgy’s notion that materialistic people who frequently use inflated and
unrealistic expectations of their SOL (such as ideal expectations) are likely to feel dis-
satisfied with their SOL, which in turn spills over to life dissatisfaction. These theoretical
links are shown in our model (see Fig. 1) as Hypotheses 1–3.
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Fig. 1 The conceptual model
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An example of an ideal expectation is ‘‘I want to be very rich.’’ People are likely to feel
disappointed with their SOL when they frequently evaluate their current state of affairs
against such ideal standards. Materialistic people are likely to make more frequent eval-
uations of SOL using ideal-based expectations than non-materialistic people (Hypothesis
1). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is essentially based on Sirgy’s (1998) thesis. Also consistent with
Sirgy’s (1998) thesis, our second hypothesis states that the greater the frequency of
evaluations of SOL based on ideal expectations, the lower the overall satisfaction with
SOL (Hypothesis 2). Our third hypothesis posits that the more a person feels dissatisfied
with his or her SOL the more he or she is likely to feel dissatisfied with his or her life at
large (Hypothesis 3). There is much evidence in the quality-of-life literature suggesting
that satisfaction with material life contributes positively and substantially to life satis-
faction (e.g., Diener and Fujita 1995; Gerdtham and Johannesson 2001; Peiro 2006;
Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998).
However, contrary to Sirgy (1998), we believe that materialistic people also frequently
evaluate their SOL using realistic expectations based on their ability to generate income.
Materialistic people who frequently engage in this type of SOL evaluations are likely to
feel more economically motivated than their non-materialistic counterparts. In other words,
we do not necessarily think that non-materialistic people make more frequent SOL eval-
uations using ability-based expectations than materialistic people. Rather, we posit that
non-materialistic people are not likely to make frequent SOL evaluations using any kind of
expectation, period. This may be due to the fact that they do not place much salience on
their material life (e.g., Belk 1984, 1985, 1989; Richins 1987, 1994a, b; Richins and
Dawson 1992; Richins and Rudmin 1994). If they regard their material life as less
important, they are not likely to engage in frequent evaluations of their SOL. Rather, they
are more likely to evaluate other life domains they regard as important such as family life,
social life, spiritual life, and community life (e.g., Kasser and Ryan 1993). Hence, only
materialistic people are likely to frequently evaluate their material life (i.e., SOL) using
various types of expectations (ideal expectations, ability expectations, etc.).
While it may be true that materialistic people frequently evaluate their SOL using ideal
expectations, it is our position that materialistic people often use both ideal and ability-
based standards. Some may use ideal expectations more frequently (especially when they
compare their SOL in certain situations that may prompt ideal standards such as watching
the rich and famous on television), while others may use realistic (ability-based) standards
more frequently (especially in situations that may prompt ability standards such as situa-
tions related to achievement). Materialistic people are likely to make SOL evaluations
based on ability expectations when they perceive that their economic aspirations are likely
to be achieved as a direct function of their hard work. They believe that their economic
goals are challenging yet attainable with hard work. Thus, they are likely to be motivated
to achieve their SOL goals. In this case, ability-based expectations are used as an economic
goal (Szymanski and Henard 2001). In contrast, materialistic people are also likely to make
SOL evaluations based on ideal-expectations when they believe that their economic
aspirations may be unattainable. When the SOL is perceived to be too high and unat-
tainable, they are more likely to use ideal expectations as a standard of comparison in their
evaluations of their SOL (Szymanski and Henard 2001). In other words, we believe that
there are two types of materialistic people: those who frequently evaluate their SOL using
unrealistic and inflated (ideal-based) expectations and those who frequently evaluate their
SOL using realistic and non-inflated (ability-based) expectations. Hypothesis 1 focuses on
one segment of materialistic people—those who frequently make SOL judgments based on
ideal expectations. Materialistic people in this segment tend to make comparisons with
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other wealthy people, and they strive to become as wealthy (or more wealthy) than their
aspiration group.
Hypothesis 4 focuses on the other segment—those who frequently make SOL judg-
ments based on ability expectations. Materialistic people in this segment evaluate their
own SOL based on realistic expectations; they anticipate improvement in their SOL based
on an assessment of their abilities and their current situation. Therefore, we also expect
materialism to be a positive predictor of frequency of SOL evaluations using ability-based
expectations (Hypothesis 4). In sum, we do expect that materialism to be positively related
to both types of expectations (i.e., frequency of SOL evaluations based on both ideal and
ability expectations).
Sirgy (1998) would expect that materialism would be a negative predictor of frequency
of SOL evaluations based on ability expectations. We part company with Sirgy (1998) in
regards to this hypothesis. Furthermore, we believe that those who make frequent SOL
evaluations using ability-based expectations are likely to feel more economically moti-
vated than those who do not (Hypothesis 5). Consistent with experts on the subject, we
define economic motivation as the drive to achieve economic goals (McClelland 1961;
McClelland and Winters 1969). The hypothesized effect may be due to self-efficacy (e.g.,
Bandura 1997; Diener and Fujita 1995; Pinquart and Sörensen 2000). Self-efficacy reflects
the person’s confidence in his ability to take on and put on the necessary effort to succeed
at economic tasks. People who frequently evaluate their SOL positively based on their
ability to get things done are likely to feel more economically motivated than those who do
not.
Finally, we hypothesize that the greater the economic motivation, the greater the life
satisfaction (Hypothesis 6). Economic motivation is likely to increase life satisfaction
because economic motivation imbues people with the feelings of economic optimism and
confidence in their progress towards their economic goals. Thus, those who are econom-
ically motivated are likely to experience feelings of happiness because of their optimism,
confidence in their ability to reach their goals, and their anticipation of the fruits of their
labor (Van Boven and Ashworth 2007). In other words, people who feel more economi-
cally motivated are likely to experience a high level of optimism and hope, important
ingredients in life satisfaction (Seligman 1998, 2002).
3 Method
3.1 Sampling and Data Collection
To test the conceptual model shown in Fig. 1, a consumer survey was conducted in a city
in each of seven countries in 2007: Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Egypt,
Korea, Turkey, and the United States. Our goal in collecting data from different countries
is to generate adequate variance in the constructs, not to conduct cross-cultural
comparisons.
The survey questionnaire was translated to local languages and then back-translated to
English by bilingual speakers in each country. Thereafter, a stratified/cluster sampling
technique was used to collect the data. Specifically, each city was divided into neigh-
borhoods and these neighborhoods were categorized as being of high, medium, or low
income. After selecting two sample neighborhoods from each category, a systematic-
random sampling procedure was used to collect the survey data. Once a potential
respondent agreed to complete the questionnaire, the researcher made arrangements to pick
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up the questionnaires 4–7 days later. Overall, 128, 301, 149, 146, 148, 150, and 163
completed questionnaires were collected from the aforementioned countries respectively.
Of the 1,185 respondents, approximately 40% were male and 60% were female. The age of
respondents ranged from 18 to 87 with a mean of 39.37. Forty-seven cases were deleted
from the analyses due to significant missing data. Following deletion, the percentage of
missing data was less than five percent for each variable and those missing data were
randomly distributed. Therefore, they were handled by using the maximum likelihood
estimation. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for each country independently.
3.2 Measures
3.2.1 Materialism
Richins and Dawson (1992) conceptualized and measured materialism using three sub-
dimensions of materialism: centrality, success, and happiness. However, based on a
thorough literature review and a discussion of the shortcomings of current materialism
measures (Roberts et al. 2005; Wong et al. 2003), we modified the Richins and Dawson’s
materialism scale to reflect three sources of motivation: (1) the belief in the notion that
material possessions leads to happiness in life (Richins and Dawson 1992); (2) the belief
that material possessions symbolize achievement and success, which in turn generate social
recognition and status (Richins and Dawson 1992), and (3) the belief that material pos-
sessions make people feel distinctive from others, which in turn promote self-regard (Belk
1988; Tian et al. 2001). In other words, it is believed that materialism is best conceptu-
alized in terms of happiness, social recognition, and uniqueness. Therefore, our modified
measure of materialism builds on the Richins and Dawson (1992) measure by refining the
Table 1 Descriptive statistics (total sample size = 1,185)
Australia Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Germany Egypt Korea Turkey USA
Gender
Men (%) 57 (44.5) 120 (39.9) 58 (39.7) 54 (36.2) 31 (20.9) 72 (48) 78 (47.9)
Women (%) 70 (54.7) 180 (59.8) 88 (60.3) 95 (63.8) 117 (70.1) 76 (50.7) 84 (51.5)
Missing (%) 1 (0.80) 1 (0.30) NA NA NA 2 (1.3) 1 (0.60)
Age
Range 18–81 18–84 18–87 18–65 20–61 18–67 18–83
Mean 39.36 36.36 46.17 33.44 49.31 35.05 39.17
Income level
Low (%) 31 (24.2) 101 (33.6) 49 (33.6) 49 (32.9) 49 (33.1) 50 (33.3) 61 (37.4)
Medium (%) 36 (28.1) 100 (33.2) 48 (32.9) 50 (33.6) 48 (32.4) 50 (33.3) 50 (30.7)




128 301 146 149 148 150 163
Number of
deleted cases
21 NA NA NA 3 23 NA
Final sample
size
107 301 146 149 145 127 163
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items related to happiness and social recognition and introducing the new dimension of
uniqueness.
In addition to introducing a new dimension (i.e., uniqueness), another goal related to
modifying the Richins and Dawson’s measure is to ensure a better metric invariance across
different countries (cf. Wong et al. 2003). Three items were used to measure each of these
dimensions on five-point scales (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree). The actual
items were as follows:
1. Having luxury items is important to a happy life (Happiness dimension).
2. To me, it is important to have expensive homes, cars, clothes, and other things. Having
these expensive items makes me happy (Happiness dimension)
3. Material possessions are important because they contribute a lot to my happiness
(Happiness dimension).
4. I love to buy new products that reflect status and prestige (Social recognition
dimension).
5. I like to own expensive things more so than most people because this is a sign of
success (Social recognition dimension).
6. I feel good when I buy expensive things. People think of me as a success (Social
recognition dimension).
7. I enjoy owning expensive things that make people think of me as unique and different
(Uniqueness dimension).
8. I usually buy expensive products and brands to make me feel unique and different
(Uniqueness dimension).
9. I usually buy expensive things that make me look distinctive (Uniqueness dimension).
3.2.2 Frequency of Evaluation of Standard of Living with Ideal and Ability-Based
Expectations
A measure of frequency of evaluation of SOL with ideal and ability-based expectations
was developed for this study. Respondents were provided with the following prompt:
‘‘Most people have strong feelings about their standard of living because they compare
their family’s current financial situation with different types of standards of comparisons.
The questions below are designed to capture the standard of comparison you use in
evaluating your family’s standard of living.’’ Single items were used to measure ideal and
ability-based expectations in evaluating SOL on 10-point scales where 1 means ‘‘no, my
feelings about my standard of living are not frequently based on this standard of com-
parison’’ and 10 means ‘‘yes, my feelings about my standard of living are frequently based
on this standard of comparison.’’ The actual item capturing frequency of SOL evaluation
using ability-based expectations is as follows:
Some compare their family’s financial situation based on their education and skills as
well as family status and connections. Thus, they may feel happy with their financial
situation because their current situation is better than or equal to what they have
expected based on their education, skills, family status, and connections; or they may
feel less happy because their current situation is significantly below what they
expected based on their education, skills, family status, and connections (Ability-
based Expectations of SOL).
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The actual item capturing frequency of SOL evaluation using ideal-based expectations
is as follows:
Some people compare their family’s financial situation with some ideal goal of
wealth they desire to have. Thus, they may feel happy with their financial situation
because their current situation meets their ideal goal, or they may feel less happy
because their current situation is significantly below their ideal (Ideal-based
Expectations of SOL).
3.2.3 Satisfaction with SOL
Satisfaction with SOL is considered interchangeably with such constructs as satisfaction
with material life (e.g., Richins and Rudmin 1994), subjective economic well-being (e.g.,
Hayo and Seifert 2003), and satisfaction with material possessions (e.g., Ogden and Venkat
2001). Five semantic-differential items were used to measure satisfaction with SOL
(Ogden and Venkat 2001). Specifically, participants were asked to report their feelings
about the things their family own, their family’s SOL, and their family’s financial situation
overall on a seven-point scale (happy/angry; good/bad; contented/frustrated; fulfilled/dis-
appointed; and pleased/displeased).
3.2.4 Economic Motivation
In the economic psychology literature the term ‘‘economic motivation’’ is considered
interchangeably with terms such as ‘‘motivation for economic success’’ (Winter-Ebmer
1994), ‘‘need for achievement’’ (McClelland and Winter 1969), and ‘‘work motivation’’
(Richins and Rudmin 1994). Our economic motivation measure was adapted from the Goal
Instability Scale developed by Robbins and Patton (1985). The following five items were
used on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree): ‘‘(1) I don’t seem to
make decisions by myself; (2) I seem to lose my sense of direction in life; (3) It’s easier for
me to start than to finish projects; (4) I don’t seem to get going on anything; (5) I don’t
seem to have the drive to get my work done.’’ The scores are reverse coded to ensure that
the higher score are reflective of higher levels of economic motivation, and vice versa. The
measure has demonstrated reliability and validity (Robbins and Patton 1985).
3.2.5 Life Satisfaction
The short version of the Campbell et al. (1976) scale was used to measure life satisfaction.
Specifically, participants were asked to rate their life on the following items by using
7-point semantic-differential descriptors: boring/interesting; useless/worthwhile; full/
empty; discouraging/helpful, and disappointing/rewarding. This measure has a long history
of validational use in the quality-of-life literature (Diener 1984; Diener et al. 1999; Keng
et al. 2000; Peiro 2006; Sirgy et al. 1998).
3.2.6 Item Parceling
Before performing the analyses, item parceling was conducted on materialism. Based on
Bagozzi and Heatherton’s (1994) recommendation, three dimensions were created for this
construct to account for measurement error. Indeed, because materialism is considered a
three-factor construct (i.e., happiness, success, and distinctiveness), the indicators of each
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factor were summed to develop three dimensions. These item parcels were used in sub-
sequent analyses.
4 Results
The Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step method was applied to estimate the mea-
surement model in the first step and the structural model in the second step. The two-step
model is an approach to structural equation modeling (SEM) to separate the measurement
failures from the structural ones. In the first step, a confirmatory factor analysis identifies
the specification errors in the measurement model (i.e., the model that includes the rela-
tions between latent variables and their indicators). Then, in the second step, specifications
in the structural equation model (i.e., the model that tests the relations between endogenous
and exogenous variables) are identified. Doing so, problems of measurement specification
are isolated from the problems of structural specification.
LISREL 8.80 (Joreskog and Sorbom 2006) was used to analyze the covariance matrices
in all analyses. Because the goal of this research was neither to look at differences between
countries nor to compare countries in terms of the conceptual model, a pooled sample was
employed in the analysis. Specifically, our goal in collecting data from different countries
was to generate adequate variance in the constructs, not to conduct cross-cultural
comparisons.
4.1 Measurement Model Results
Prior to conducting a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), normality of the observed
variables was inspected. Some of the variables revealed high skewness and kurtosis values.
The Maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method is considered to be very robust even
with highly skewed/kurtosis data. However, it is argued that ML produces inflated Chi-
square statistics and leads to the rejection of too many true models when the variables are
highly non-normal (West et al. 1995). To deal with this problem, the Satorra-Bentler
corrected Chi-square was used in all analyses.
To estimate the measurement model, the six constructs, namely materialism, frequency
of evaluations of SOL based on ideal expectations, frequency of evaluations of SOL based
on ability expectations, satisfaction with SOL, economic motivation, and life satisfaction,
were modeled as freely correlated first-order factors with their respective indicators. The
Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-square value for the pooled sample was 581.80 with 158
degrees of freedom. Given the large sample size, the Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-square
value was significant at 0.001. However, other goodness-of-fit statistics suggested a close
and adequate fit to the data with the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA;
Steiger and Lind 1980; Browne and Cudeck 1989) = 0.049, Bentler’s (1990) Comparative
Fit Index (CFI) = 0.98, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR; Bentler
1995) = 0.041, and Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI; Joreskog and Sorbom 1984) = 0.94.
Because the construct validity (the ability of a measurement tool to actually measure the
concept being studied) ‘‘lies at the very heart of the scientific process’’ (Churchill 1979,
p. 70), the measurement model results were used to establish the construct validity for the
measures used in this study. Specifically, two subtests of construct validity (convergent
validity and discriminant validity) were used to establish construct validity.
To assess convergent validity, four separate statistics were examined: Average Variance
Extracted (AVE), composite reliabilities, coefficient Alphas, and factor loadings. The
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summary of results for tests of convergent validity (internal consistency) for the constructs
with multiple items (i.e., materialism, satisfaction with SOL, economic motivation, and life
satisfaction) and item parcels (i.e., materialism dimensions) is given in Table 2. To
demonstrate convergent validity, the AVE for each construct should be greater than 0.50
and the composite reliability of a factor should be equal to or greater than 0.60 (Fornell and
Larcker 1981). All AVE values ranged from 0.530 to 0.702. Composite reliabilities were
greater than 0.60 with a range of 0.844–0.921 (excluding parcels). Similarly, coefficient
Alphas were relatively high and ranged from 0.838 to 0.921 (excluding parcels). Fur-
thermore, all factor loadings were significant at the 0.05 level. All these results imply that
convergent validity (internal consistency) was satisfactory for the constructs in question.
To test for discriminant validity, the squares of correlations between any two constructs
were compared with the AVE estimates of those two constructs (Fornell and Larcker
1981). The squared correlations ranged from 0.001 to 0.264. Because the lowest AVE
estimate was 0.530, the AVE for each construct was greater than its squared correlation
with any other construct. Accordingly, discriminant validity was supported.
The results of convergent and discriminant validity tests provided evidence for the
construct validity of the measures used in this study.
4.2 Structural Model Results
The overall structural model was supported by the data with Satorra-Bentler scaled v2 (168,
N = 1,138) = 2,045.44 (p \ 0.001); RMSEA = 0.099; CFI = 0.91; NFI = 0.90;
SRMR = 0.10. Furthermore, all path coefficients were significant at the 0.001 level and in
expected direction (see Table 3). See correlations matrix in the Appendix.
Our model involves six hypotheses—each is supported as indicated by the significant
coefficients shown in parentheses following an articulation of each:
Hypothesis 1 Materialistic people evaluate their SOL more frequently based on ideal
expectations than non-materialistic counterparts (standardized estimate = 0.26; p \ 0.001).
Hypothesis 2 The greater the frequency of evaluations of SOL based on ideal expec-
tations, the lower the overall satisfaction with SOL (standardized estimate = -0.18;
p \ 0.001).
Table 2 Reliability results (N = 1,138)
Coefficient alpha Composite reliability AVE
Materialism 0.914 0.844 0.650
Parcel 1: happiness 0.834 0.836 0.630
Parcel 2: social recognition 0.851 0.855 0.663
Parcel 3: uniqueness 0.850 0.858 0.670
Economic motivation 0.842 0.853 0.542
Satisfaction with SOL 0.921 0.921 0.702
Life satisfaction 0.838 0.849 0.530
AVE average variance explained, SOL standard of living
Composite reliability and AVE values for parcels were calculated from separately conducted confirmatory
factor analyses; composite reliability and AVE values for latent constructs were calculated from the final
confirmatory factor analysis that included all constructs
Coefficient alpha value for materialism was calculated by using the original items, not parcels
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Hypothesis 3 The more a person feels dissatisfied with his or her SOL, the more he or
she is likely to feel dissatisfied with his or her life at large (standardized estimate = 0.79;
p \ 0.001).
Hypothesis 4 Materialistic people evaluate their SOL more frequently based on ability
expectations than non-materialistic counterparts (standardized estimate = 0.11;
p \ 0.001).
Hypothesis 5 People who make frequent SOL evaluations using ability-based expecta-
tions are likely to feel more economically motivated than those who do not (standardized
estimate = 0.11; p \ 0.001).
Hypothesis 6 The greater the economic motivation, the greater the life satisfaction
(standardized estimate = 0.62; p \ 0.001).
5 Discussion
The study results provide support for the predictive effects of materialism on satisfaction
with SOL, life satisfaction, and economic motivation as mediated by frequency of SOL
evaluations based on ability versus ideal expectations. Specifically, the results support the
hypotheses that materialism increases the frequency of evaluations based on inflated and
unrealistic expectations of wanting to be rich (Hypothesis 1). This hypothesis is essentially
consistent with Sirgy’s (1998) theory of materialism and quality of life. The study findings
also support the notion that the greater the frequency of evaluations of SOL based on ideal
expectations, the lower the overall satisfaction with SOL (Hypothesis 2). Again, this
hypothesis is consistent with Sirgy (1998). The results also supported the hypothesis that
the more a person feels dissatisfied with his or her SOL, the more he or she is likely to feel
dissatisfied with his or her life at large (Hypothesis 3). This finding is consistent with much
of the research in quality-of-life studies that suggests that satisfaction with material life
contributes positively and substantially to life satisfaction (e.g., Diener and Fujita 1995;
Gerdtham and Johannesson 2001; Peiro 2006; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998).
Findings related to Hypotheses 1–3 combined are also consistent with a recent study
examining the relationship between frequency of social comparisons and subjective well-
being (Fujita 2008). This study demonstrated that people experiencing low levels of
Table 3 Parameter estimates
Path ML estimates (SD) Std. ML estimates Critical ratio p values
Materialism ? SOL_Ideal 0.23 (0.03) 0.26 8.65 0.001
Materialism ? SOL_Ability 0.09 (0.03) 0.11 3.28 0.001
SOL_Ideal ? satisfaction with SOL -0.08 (0.02) -0.18 -5.02 0.001
SOL_Ability ? economic motivation 0.04 (0.01) 0.11 3.20 0.001
Satisfaction with SOL ? life sat 0.54 (0.03) 0.79 16.90 0.001
Economic motivation ? life sat 0.57 (0.04) 0.62 12.97 0.001
ML estimates (SD) unstandardized maximum likelihood estimates (standard deviation), Std. ML esti-
mates completely standardized maximum likelihood estimates, SOL standard of living, SOL_Ideal ideal-
based expectations of SOL, SOL_Ability ability-based expectations of SOL, Life Sat life satisfaction
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subjective well-being tend to engage in frequent social comparisons, more so than those
experiencing high levels of subjective well-being. Those who engage in frequent com-
parisons were also found to score highly on measures of neuroticism, a personality trait
negatively related with subjective well-being (Diener 1984; Diener et al. 1999).
The study findings provided support to the notion that materialism is also a positive
predictor of SOL evaluations using ability-based expectations (Hypothesis 4). In other
words, high materialistic people do not only evaluate their SOL using ideal expectations
but also ability expectations, and as such this contributes to economic motivation
(Hypothesis 5). As explained earlier, this effect may be due to self-efficacy (e.g., Ban-
dura 1997; Diener and Fujita 1995; Pinquart and Sörensen 2000). In other words, people
who evaluate their SOL positively based on their ability to get things done are likely to
feel more economically motivated than those who do not. Furthermore, the data support
the hypothesis that economic motivation contributes to life satisfaction (Hypothesis 6),
which is consistent with much research in subjective well-being (e.g., Seligman 1998,
2002).
The study findings underscore the assertion that materialism is different from material
well-being. First, material well-being plays a significant role in life satisfaction (Layard
2005). That is, satisfaction with SOL contributes to overall happiness in life (life satis-
faction). On the other hand, materialism refers to the value individuals place on their
material life vis-à-vis other life domains such as social life, leisure life, family life, and
spiritual life (Robert and Clement 2007). Further, materialism, may adversely affect life
satisfaction because materialistic people allocate much of their time, energy, and resources
to the pursuit of material gains, which may come at the expense of gains in other important
life domains such as social life, family life, leisure life, and spiritual life (Kasser and Ryan
1993; Sirgy and Wu 2009). In addition, materialism is also a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, it may lead to life dissatisfaction through SOL evaluations based on ideal
expectations; and on the other hand, it may lead to life satisfaction through SOL evalua-
tions based on ability expectations.
What are the policy implications of this research? This study demonstrates that in
relation to life satisfaction, materialism has positive and negative consequences. Public
policies should be formulated to minimize the negative effects of materialism and maxi-
mize the positive effects. In other words, materialistic people should be encouraged to
evaluate their SOL based on ability expectations, not ideal expectations. One can argue that
an economic system of meritocracy encourages people to evaluate their lot in life based on
ability-related criteria such as performance based on ability (i.e., education, expertise, and
experience).
In essence, meritocracy is a system of government or organization wherein appoint-
ments are made and responsibilities given based on demonstrated talent and ability (merit),
rather than wealth, family connections, class privilege, friends, seniority, popularity or
other historical determinants of social position or political power (Wikipedia 2009). The
notion that people are evaluated and rewarded based on merit is fundamental in Western
economies (Son Hing et al. 2002). Meritocracy becomes part of an employee’s contract
with the employer, whether formal or psychological, and that the employee’s potential for
career development and economic rewards is based on their ability and talent demonstrated
within their role. Therefore, a clear public policy implication based on our study findings is
that public policy should be based clearly on meritocracy. People should be able to learn,
through educational, political, and economic institutions, that economic motivation, sat-
isfaction with material life, and ultimately life satisfaction are all linked to meritocracy.
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Future research is encouraged to test alternative models and focus on cross-cultural
comparisons. One may hypothesize that causality is reversed. Could it be the case that
those who are already happy experience greater satisfaction with their standard of living?
Quality-of-life researchers refer to this phenomenon as ‘‘top-down spillover’’ (Diener
1984; Diener et al. 1999; Sirgy 2002). In other words, happy people tend to evaluate their
life domains (material life as being one of their life domains) more positively than unhappy
people, and vice versa. Could it be that happy people become more economically moti-
vated than unhappy people? In other words, something about happiness makes people more
economically motivated, not the other way around. There is some evidence suggesting that
happy people tend to experience more vigor, physical strength, emotional energy, and
cognitive liveliness than unhappy people (Shirom 2011). This finding is explained using
Fredrickson’s (2001) broaden-and-build theory that is gaining much acceptance in quality-
of-life studies. This theory posits that happiness does have cognitive and motivational
consequences in that positive emotions serve to expand mental and physical capability and
to heighten achievement motivation.
With respect to cross-cultural comparisons, it may be that certain cultures may place
greater value on both materialism and meritocracy, and the theoretical relationships prop-
agated by our model (materialism, frequency of SOL evaluations based on ideal versus
ability expectations, satisfaction with material life, economic motivation, and life satis-
faction) are likely to be more evident than in cultures that do not place high value on
materialism and meritocracy. Although our study involves data collected from various
countries (Australia, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Germany, Egypt, Korea, Turkey, and the USA),
our focus has been internal rather than external validity. In other words, our goal was to
enhance variability in our study constructs rather than to conduct cross-cultural compari-
sons. Such studies should constitute the next step in conducting programmatic research on
this topic.
Future research should also attempt to segment the materialistic segment into those who
make SOL evaluations based on ideal versus ability expectations. Our research has focused
on demonstrating that making SOL evaluations based on ideal expectations is likely to
contribute to life dissatisfaction; and by the same token, making SOL evaluations based on
ability expectations is likely to contribute to life satisfaction. Future research should
conduct cluster analysis segmenting the highly materialistic people into two segments and
test the hypothesis that high materialistic people who make SOL evaluations based on ideal
expectations are likely to report lower levels of life satisfaction; and conversely, those who
are highly materialistic who make SOL evaluations based on ability expectations are likely
to report higher levels of life satisfaction.
Future research could identify under what conditions materialistic people are likely
to evaluate their SOL using ideal versus ability standards. We previously alluded to
situational prompts such as when exposed to information about the rich and famous
(prompt that may evoke ideal standards) versus information related to entrepreneurship
(prompt that may evoke ability standards). Future research could investigate the effects
of these situational prompts on the frequency of SOL evaluations using ideal versus
ability expectations and empirically document the effects of varying situational
prompts.
Future research should also examine the effects of other types of expectations that
people use in their SOL evaluations. Sirgy (1998) alluded to at least six different types of
expectations frequently used in SOL evaluations: ideal, deserved, need-based, past, pre-
dictive, and ability-based. Our study focused on the varying effects of ideal versus ability-
based expectation in SOL evaluations. Sirgy theorized that materialistic people are likely
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to frequently use ideal, deserved, and need-based standards, while non-materialistic people
frequently use past, predictive, and ability-based expectations. Our study provided evi-
dence that materialistic people frequently use both ideal and ability-based standards in their
SOL evaluations. One can hypothesize that people who are high on materialism may use
all types of standards (possibly the six different types of standards) more frequently than
their non-materialistic counterparts. They may do so as a direct function of situational
prompts that may evoke different standards. For example, situational prompts that may
evoke ideal standards would be information cues about the rich and famous; prompts
evoking deserved standards would be cues related to equity and justice; prompts evoking
need-based standards would be cues related to expenses to support a certain lifestyle;
prompts evoking past standards would be cues related to one’s past history; prompts
evoking predictive standards would be cues related to parents’ references to one’s future
economic potential, and finally prompts related to ability standards may involve cues
related to the individual level of education, occupation, and professional experience. Future
experimental studies may empirically demonstrate the effect of situational prompts on the
frequent use of varying standards in SOL evaluations.
Last but not least, our study included a measure of economic motivation that some may
be view as confounded with subjective well-being. The emphasis of this measure is the
extent to which people strive to attain goals they set in life, economic goals are likely to be
very important for most people. Those who do not set goals and are not committed to
achieving important goals in life are likely to experience lower subjective well-being.
There is much research in goal theory in personality and social psychology that substan-
tiates this point. For a review see Diener (1984) and Diener et al. (1999) for supporting
evidence. Future research should employ economic motivation measures that are clearly
discriminant from subjective well-being measures.
In sum, we hope that our theoretical model and study findings will encourage future
research in this area and promote the ideals of meritocracy as a way to enhance the quality
of life for all.
Appendix
Table 4 Correlations, means, and standard deviations
1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean SD
Materialism 1 2.60 0.84
SOL_Ideal 0.298** 1 4.65 2.74
SOL_Ability 0.140** 0.321** 1 5.66 2.73
Satisfaction with SOL -0.003 -0.161** -0.024 1 5.22 1.28
Economic motivation -0.204** -0.045 0.086** 0.163** 1 3.43 0.92
Life satisfaction -0.161** -0.117** 0.076* 0.514** 0.361** 1 4.84 1.23
SOL standard of living, SOL_Ideal ideal-based expectations of SOL, SOL_Ability ability-based expectations
of SOL
* p \ 0.05; ** p \ 0.01
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